

**The Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism:
Goals, Strategies, and Open Questions**

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Forthcoming: *Criminal Justice and Behavior*

* This research was supported by National Institute of Justice subaward No. Z909601 to the University of Maryland and the Hebrew University, and subaward No. 5-45059-D under prime award No. Z988504 from the Department of Homeland Security's START Center at the University of Maryland. Points of view in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the U.S. Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland Security. We would like to thank Gali Aviv for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.

Abstract

Police innovation over the last three decades has been focused primarily on questions of crime and disorder, and community. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attack, the US and other Western countries have been challenged by a new set of responsibilities for policing, which are likely to require changes in police strategies and organization. To date, there are few descriptions of possible policing models for such police responses to terrorism. In this paper we present preliminary findings from a study focusing on a national model of policing terrorism that pre-dated recent terrorist threats. The Israel National Police has a long history of experience with the problem of terrorism, and is considered highly efficient and professional in its approach to homeland security. We review the Israeli model for policing terrorism and present an initial description of its three broad tasks as defined by the Israeli police: 1) Early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; 2) Response activities once the attack has been launched; 3) Response activities once the attack has occurred. Those tasks are developed in the context of an overarching goal of allowing Israeli citizens to continue with their normal routines despite terrorist threats. Drawing from the Israeli experience, we also raise a series of questions that we view as critical for developing a broader understanding of the potential benefits, as well as dangers, of police taking a more significant role in counter terrorism and homeland security functions. In particular we argue that too little is known about measuring and assessing the effectiveness of anti-terrorism strategies, their potential impacts on other core police functions including crime control, and their implications for the relationship of the police with the public.

Over the last three decades American policing has gone through a period of significant change and innovation. In what is a relatively short historical time frame the police began to reconsider their fundamental mission, the nature of the core strategies of policing, and the character of their relationships with the communities that they serve (Weisburd and Braga, 2006). While scholars have raised questions about the effectiveness of many specific tactics, many of the new and innovative approaches have been found to have crime prevention benefits (e.g. see Eck and McGuire, 2000; National Research Council, 2004; Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter and Bushway, 1997; Weisburd and Eck, 2004). In turn, there is widespread agreement that such tactics as community policing have made police in the 21st century much more responsive to communities and their problems than policing in the decades before this wave of innovation began (Maguire and King, 2004).

While there is broad agreement among police scholars that the last three decades have “witnessed a remarkable degree of innovation in policing” (National Research Council, 2004: 82), such innovation has been concerned primarily with questions of crime and community. American police were in some sense caught unaware when the country’s security priorities were radically altered by the terrorist attacks on American soil on 9/11 in 2001 (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005). And they were not alone. Even countries that had organized to fight terrorism much earlier than 9/11, such as Great Britain and Germany, began to reappraise their readiness and rethink the role of police in preventing terrorism and limiting its consequences (Bayley and Weisburd, Forth.).

The involvement of police in homeland security¹ raises new problems and questions for American police, as well as those in other democratic countries. On one level, police involvement in homeland security is a natural extension of their traditional roles in maintaining order in communities, and responding to emergencies, such as riots or natural disasters. But even if we accept and recognize that role, it is clear that terrorism may call for new responsibilities for the police that emphasize the investigation and identification of terrorists or the prevention of terrorism. Such new roles moreover are likely to increase police investment in what some scholars have called "high policing" (Brodeur 1983; Brodeur and Dupeyron 1993). High policing is characterized by its focus on strategic issues at a macro level, rather than local crime and disorder problems that have been the primary focus of most Western police agencies (Bayley, 2006; Bayley and Weisburd, Forth.). High policing also takes an approach that emphasizes controlling rather than servicing the public (Bayley and Weisburd, Forth; Sidel, 2004; Thacher, 2005; Wilkinson, 2001).

American and many other democratic policing agencies have little experience in how to organize and develop such homeland security functions. Because such roles are new, there is also little understanding of the consequences for police in taking on these new responsibilities. Though as early as 1995, American police agencies considered terrorism as a potential problem, local agencies did not see it as a priority in the allocation of resources or personnel (Riley and Hoffman, 1995). In contrast, today homeland security has become a central priority for the police in the US and other Western democracies (Bamford, 2004; Bayley and Weisburd, Forth; International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005; National Research Council, 2004). They are expected to uncover terrorist networks, collaborate with other

agencies, respond to suspicious situations and serve as first-line emergency responders (National Research Council, 2004).

In this paper we present preliminary findings from a study focusing on a national model of policing terrorism that pre-dated recent terrorist threats. The Israel National Police (INP) has a long history of experience with the problem of terrorism. At least since the early 1970s, it has been given significant homeland security responsibilities. Moreover, though terrorist activities have varied over the last three decades in Israel, it has remained a core national concern throughout this period.² In turn, the Israel National Police is considered highly efficient and professional in its approach to homeland security responsibilities (e.g. see Kamhine, 2000). While there are, as we detail below, limitations to our ability to draw inferences from the Israeli case to the US and other Western democracies, the Israeli model remains an important example to draw lessons from, both in terms of police strategies, and the impacts of entrusting democratic police agencies with key Homeland Security functions.

Below we review the Israeli model for policing terrorism and its main goals, and present an initial description of its three broad tasks: 1) Early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; 2) Response activities once the attack has been launched; 3) Response activities once the attack has occurred. Drawing from the Israeli case, we also raise a series of questions that we view as critical for developing a broader understanding of the potential benefits, as well as dangers, of police taking a more significant role in counter terrorism and homeland security functions. In particular, we argue that too little is known about measuring and assessing the effectiveness of anti-terrorism strategies, their potential impacts on other core police functions including crime control, and their implications for the

relationship of the police with the public. We begin our paper with a more general history of the Israeli police and its historical role in responding to terrorism, and a discussion of the limitations of drawing inferences from the Israeli case.

The Israel National Police

When the state of Israel was established in 1948, the "police command" of the British Mandate continued to form the legal basis for civilian police activities in Israel. The responsibility for establishing the Israeli police was placed on Lieutenant General Yaa'kov Dori, Chief of the General Staff of the IDF (Israel Defense Forces, the Israeli Army) at the time, and on the "Hagana" (the pre-state Jewish militia), which was the only organization with the capabilities and the authority to carry out such a task. The Israel National Police was founded as a brigade in the IDF, and depended on the IDF for weapons and supplies. Its initial organizational structure, as well as its preliminary operational procedures, was based heavily on the model of the British Mandate Police, which was a colonial-military police.

The military influence on the Israel National Police was accentuated by the fact that the initial police cohorts were recruited from the overall pool of army recruits. Individuals who were over the age of 35 and without the necessary military qualifications, were drafted to the police rather than to military units. "Border Guard" police officers (see below), who comprise about a third of the INP today, are still recruited primarily as part of the national military draft. A number of Israeli policing scholars have noted in this context that the military model is firmly rooted in the organization, culture and procedures of the Israeli police (Ben-Porat, 1988; Hovav and Amir, 1979; Shadmi and Hod, 1996; Weisburd, Shalev and Amir, 2002; also see review by Shalev, 2003).

Organization

Israel uses a national model of policing, in which all police units are commanded by the Commissioner of Police, who is appointed by the government following the recommendation of the Minister of Public Security. Geographically, the Israel National Police is divided into six districts: Northern, Tel-Aviv, Central, Judea and Samaria (West Bank), Jerusalem, and Southern. Each District ("Machoz") is again divided into two to four sub-districts ("Merchav"), and within the sub-districts are the local police stations. These three geographical levels also represent the hierarchy of command, all subordinated to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the national police agency.

The INP includes two main organizational components, the regular police force, often termed the "Blue Police," and the Border Guard. The Border Guard functions as a quasi-military force and makes up about one third of the estimated 28,000 sworn officers in the INP. Its members wear military green rather than the traditional light blue worn by the rest of the INP. The Border Guard is responsible for security activities in areas on the "seam" between Israel and the Palestinian areas and plays a central role in policing such areas as Jerusalem, that present special security concerns. The Border Guard, whose units are for the most part subordinated to the "Blue Police" territorial commander, is the "...operational and professional arm of the Police in matters of internal security and combating terrorism..."³ Importantly, it also plays a role in traditional police activities such as combating crime.

The National Police Headquarters in Jerusalem is composed of seven departments (Patrol & Security, Organization and Planning, Traffic, Community and

Civil Guard, Logistic Support, Human Resources, and Investigations & Intelligence Department), which are expected to assist the Police Commissioner in developing policy, allocating resources, planning, coordinating and supervising the various districts. Headquarters includes several additional units, such as the Legal Adviser, Spokesman, Accountant, Public Complaints etc., which also answer directly to the Police Commissioner. Lastly, several police units operate on the national level and hold various responsibilities including important homeland security tasks, such as the National Unit for Organized and International Crime.

The Israel National Police also has authority over the “Civil Guard,” the largest voluntary organization in Israel. The Civil Guard was established in 1974 following several major terror attacks that took place that year. Its estimated 75,000 volunteers directly assist police units in all areas of responsibility and throughout the country. Their activities include patrolling, setting road blocks, and securing local and major events, schools and public transportation. Further, volunteers assist in other police duties such as traffic control, investigations, identification of disaster victims, rescue operations etc. In addition to the significant contribution in terms of manpower, the Civil Guard is considered an important vehicle for fostering police-community relationships (Weisburd et al., 2002).

The responsibilities of the Israel National Police, as defined by law, include preventing crime; investigating and clearing crime; identifying offenders and bringing them to justice; supervising and controlling traffic; maintaining public order and safety of people and property; the secure imprisonment of prisoners and convicts; and maintaining homeland security.⁴ This last responsibility was assigned to the Israeli police by the government in 1974, following the rise in Palestinian terrorism and a

major terror attack in Maa'lot. This new responsibility forced the police to re-organize: The Civil Guard was established and gradually tens of thousands of volunteers patrolled their own neighborhoods. The Border Guard began securing the air and sea ports. A year later the Operations Division was established for the purpose of coordinating all operating forces and increasing their effectiveness. Further, a special unit for combating terrorism was established (the "Ya'mam"), along with the Bomb-Disposal unit. The Israel National Police has been responsible for homeland security in Israel ever since, facing repeated threats and terrorist incidents.

Within the State of Israel, the INP has full responsibility for homeland security functions. Indeed, as in the US, Canada and the UK, and in contrast to many European countries (e.g. France, Spain and Italy) where the military play an active policing role (Lutterbeck, 2004), the military is not legally empowered to engage in ordinary police functions within the borders of the State of Israel. However, in the Palestinian administered areas or areas in the West Bank under military occupation, the Israel Defense Forces has primary responsibilities for anti-terrorism activities. As we note below, however, because of the special skills of the INP, it often aids the military in operations in those areas.

Anti-Terrorism Training and Education

Since counter-terrorism is one of the explicit responsibilities of the INP, all police officers are trained to face this threat. However, a distinction can be made between four levels of specialization in counter-terrorism training. First, all officers undergo basic counter-terrorism training, which is intended for police officers whose main role within the police is *not* related to counter-terrorism. This training prepares officers for situations where they happen to encounter a terrorist incident, and focuses

on providing first response activities, such as isolating the site of a terrorist attack. The second level of training is received by the "Yassam", or "Special Patrol Unit". These officers are trained to provide very quick responses to terrorist situations, and bring them to an end as soon as possible. For example, in a case of shootings, their goal is to reach the scene and stop the shooter within minutes. To accomplish this goal they use special equipment and transportation, such as motorcycles. Their training is oriented towards this goal, and includes related exercises, such as urban warfare.

The third level of special training is received by the "Mista'arvim" unit. These officers are trained to conduct undercover operations in which they reach their target and make an arrest without being detected. Their training includes, for example, the topography of areas in which terrorist threats emerge (both within Israel and the Palestinian territories), the balance of powers between ethnic and family groups, and local customs and speech. Lastly, the "Ya'mam", or "Special Police Unit", which is the elite police counter-terrorism unit, goes through the most specialized counter-terrorism training. These officers are trained to handle very specific terrorist situations, such as releasing hostages and carrying out special operations.

Are the Israeli Police Unique?

An important question before we turn to our description of the Israeli model for policing terrorism is to ask to what extent other police forces might learn from it. There are a number of factors that distinguish the Israel National Police from other Western police forces, and elements of the specific Israeli situation that cannot be compared to other contexts. For example, as we have already noted, the INP is a national police force with strong central control. While the centralized model is common in Europe, it is very different from the diffused local model of policing

common in the United States. And even in Europe, there is a tendency for more local control of policing. For example, despite the strong centralized structure of policing in France and Italy, there are also local police agencies that are responsible to municipal government (Manna and Infante, 2000; McKee, 2001). While there has been a recent experiment with municipal policing in recent years in one small Israeli city (Bilski, 2001), the Israeli model remains highly centralized.

The continuing strong links between the military and the police in border security and in the West Bank and the existence of the quasi-military Border Guard, also suggest strong differences from the structures of policing in many other Western democracies, and especially from the US (though some Western European countries such as France, Spain and Italy, evidence strong formal connections between the police and the military). Perhaps as a result of such links, Israeli officials suggest that there are close and ongoing formal and informal contacts between the police, the Israel “SHABAK” or General Security Agency, and the military, in coordinating homeland security activities. This may be contrasted with the situation in the US before 9/11, where the lack of intelligence coordination has been strongly criticized (Henry, 2002; Kelling and Bratton, 2006; Loyka, Faggiani, and Karchmer, 2005).

Whatever the differences between the structure of the Israeli police and that of other Western democracies, it is clear that there are basic similarities. The police are constrained by regulation from abusing their authority over citizens, and are required by law to provide equal treatment to citizens irrespective of ethnic, religious or national origin⁵. Though the INP, like police agencies in other Western democracies, may not always meet these standards, these legal requirements link the INP to other democratic police agencies. The INP is also strongly influenced by international

trends in policing such as community policing, problem oriented policing, and Compstat (Weisburd et al., 2002). And like police in other democracies, they must justify and explain their actions to the larger public.

Nonetheless, it is also important to point out the special characteristics of the specific Israeli national and social context. What makes Israel a useful case study, also distinguishes it from many other Western democracies. Terrorism is not a new threat in Israel, and indeed it has been a major source of national concern since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. The US and European countries have also experienced terrorist threats in earlier decades. For example, the Puerto Rican FLAN in the United States was responsible for a series of terrorist incidents in the 1970s and 1980s (Mickolus, 1980; Mickolus, Sandler and Murdock, 1989); the Baader-Meinhof gang carried out attacks in Germany as early as the 1970s (Townshend, 2002); and the Irish Republican Army was a continual threat in the UK until recent peace negotiations (Matassa and Newburn, 2003; Mulcahy, 2005). While the experience in the UK may be closest to Israel in terms of the severity and the long term nature of the threats involved, it is clear that Israel has faced the most consistent threat of terrorism of any of the Western democracies. Moreover, the threat of terrorism in Israel was linked to a more general conventional military threat to Israel from neighboring Arab states. And in recent years, the terrorist threat has come primarily from the Palestinian Authority territories, which represent administrative areas that are, or had been previously under Israeli military control.

These factors once again suggest some caution in drawing inferences from the Israeli case, and we return to this issue later in our essay. At the same time, the extent and persistence of the threat of terrorism is precisely what makes Israel an interesting case to study. The Israel National Police has developed strategies and organizational

approaches over a number of years, and the centrality and persistence of the terrorist threats have made anti-terror policing a core function in the Israeli police. The INP provide an interesting laboratory in a democratic country to ask not only how police should respond to terrorism, but also what implications such a response has for the police task more generally.

The Israeli Model for Policing Terrorism

Our description of the Israeli model for policing terrorism is based on publicly available documentary sources, discussions with high ranking Israeli police officials and representatives of the Ministry of Public Security, Israel. These discussions were a first step for the development of a large scale research program on the Israeli model for policing terrorism, which is being funded jointly by the National Institute of Justice (USA), the Department of Homeland Security (USA), and the Ministry of Public Security (Israel). In this sense, we provide below a portrait of how the police frame and describe their model for policing terrorism.

Allowing the Public to Live as If Terrorism Did Not Exist

The police are well aware that terrorism is an ongoing threat to Israeli society, and that it is likely that terrorism will form a central problem for the Israel National Police for the foreseeable future (Fishman, 2005, also see the INP website⁶). The INP, like Israeli leaders more generally, do not view conventional terrorism as an existential- strategic threat (Levi, 2005), such as the Iranian nuclear threat⁷, but it is clear to Israeli police leaders that terrorism can undermine the confidence and security of Israeli citizens. And in this sense they see the central goal of the INP's anti-

terrorism efforts as making it possible for the general public to maintain their everyday routines. There is a great deal of emphasis, as we will describe below, on preventing terrorism, and capturing terrorists in the Israeli anti-terrorism model. But this is seen as one part of a larger effort to prevent terrorism from achieving its goal of undermining the morale and security of the public.

This goal of the police is a thread that runs through our discussions with Israeli Ministry of Public Security and police officials. It moreover is very much fit to what most scholars have seen as the central purpose of terrorism itself. As Riley and Hoffman (1995) argue:

Terrorism is violence, or threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm... terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage they cause, by having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists, for example, may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strength of the terrorists and the importance of their cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands (Riley and Hoffman, 1995:3).

To understand the INP homeland security model, it is important to recognize at the outset, that it entails much more than simply preventing and controlling terrorism, or even managing the consequences of terrorist events. It is part of a much broader strategy that is geared to defeat the goals of terrorism, by strengthening the resolve of the public and providing a context in which terrorism can be placed in the margins of Israeli everyday life. As we describe below, the Israeli police are expected to clear a terrorist scene in four hours. During the attack there is a clear protocol on reporting events to news agencies. While the police respond to these events with the

goal of tracking perpetrators, aiding victims, and identifying forensic evidence, they are most importantly trying to minimize the long term effects of the event on the public. Some might argue that in memory of the victims such attacks should not pass quickly from the public eye. But in its efforts to minimize the impacts of terrorism on everyday life, the Israel National Police organizes its efforts so that the public can go on quickly to their normal everyday business.

This broad overarching goal of the Israeli homeland security model is carried out by the police in terms of three broad types of activities: 1) Early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; 2) Response activities once the attack has been launched; 3) Response activities once the attack has occurred. Below, we detail the specific components of each of these areas of activity.

1) Early Prevention, Interdiction, and Treatment of the Sources of Terrorism.

Clearly, the most effective way to prevent terrorism from affecting the civilian population is by identifying and reacting to terrorist threats before they are actualized. This responsibility includes developing intelligence, establishing operational capabilities that will allow them to act upon the information obtained, and uprooting terrorist infrastructure. These functions of the police can be classified primarily under the rubric of what has come to be called “high policing” (Brodeur 1983; Brodeur and Dupeyron 1993).

According to Israeli officials, the key to preventing attacks before they are carried out is the development of quality intelligence and cooperation between intelligence agencies. In this, Israeli officials appear to follow closely the recommendations of American experts who emphasize the importance of collecting and sharing intelligence in the fight against terrorism (Kelling and Bratton, 2006;

Loyka et al., 2005). Indeed, the collection of intelligence by the police is carried out in cooperation with a series of other agencies in Israel, including the army and the "SHABAK." This is done at the local and national level, and is said to involve a clear division of authority and sharing of intelligence. Clearly, the centralized structure of the Israel National Police, and its strong military tradition, facilitates such intelligence cooperation. Such high policing functions flow more naturally in police agencies that are highly centralized and thus focused on strategic and national rather than local interests (Bayley and Weisburd, forth.).

The mere collection of intelligence, however, is not sufficient, since intelligence without the ability to reach a target or prevent an attack is of little value. These tasks are performed by special operations units, which are trained to enter towns or villages where terrorist actions are being planned. Within the boundaries of the State of Israel the Israel National Police is the only agency authorized to carry out such activities. Special operations in the West Bank fall under the jurisdiction of the Israeli army, however many police units are involved in such activities due to their quasi-military structure and special capabilities.

While no hard and fast data are available on these interdiction efforts, the INP now claims that more than 90% of planned attacks are prevented. Some recent examples of interdiction activities, which are part of routine prevention efforts, include the shooting of Mohamad Ramaha, the Head of the Fatah armed body in Nablus, during an attempted arrest in November 2006 (Greenberg, Hare'l and Isasharof, 2006); the shooting of a senior member of the Hamas and the arrest of two other Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in November 2006 (Bohbot, 2006); and the attempted arrest of Islamic Jihad activists in the Jenin area in January 2006 (Nahoom, Inbari and Levi, 2006).

The third aspect of prevention involves attention to the infrastructures that support terrorism. As part of these interdiction efforts, special units of the Israeli police take part in operational attacks in the West Bank directed at places where explosives and other terrorist devices are manufactured. The police, with the army and the SHABAK, raid these laboratories or lathe-shops, confiscate or destroy the equipment, and take the workers in for questioning.

Additionally, the police act against organizations and groups that fund terrorism in Israel and abroad. In this context, the police play a leadership role in the identification of “charities” that support terrorist organizations and in their prosecution. For instance, in May 2003 the leaders of the Northern Wing of the Israeli Islamic Movement were investigated and arrested for transferring funds from the Islamic Movement to terrorist organizations (see Meiri, Moshkowitz and Aichner, 2003), and were later convicted of several of the indictments in 2005 (see Rofe-Ofir and Ra'bad, 2005). Such investigations are often carried out in cooperation with police agencies worldwide, such as in the case of Sami Al-Arian, a college professor who was identified as a fund raiser for the Islamic Jihad and arrested in February 2003, in Tampa, Florida (Amit and Shaked, 2003). Innes (2006:226) calls these “prospective” prevention functions, which include surveillance and other actions against those involved with groups supporting terrorist organizations, including targeting the financing of such groups (Levi and Gilmore, 2002; McCulloch and Pickering, 2005).

In recent years, terrorist organizations have looked to illegal activities, such as drug smuggling or cooperation with organized crime, to gain financial support. There are numerous examples of terrorists utilizing the criminal world for their benefits (such as intelligence or cooperation), and in return they often pay with forged or drug

money. An example of the relationship between terrorism and crime in Israel is the case of Elchanan Tennenbaum, an Israeli businessman and former Colonel in the IDF. Tannenbaum, who traveled to Dubai in order to take part in a drug deal, was kidnapped by the Hezbollah in 2000 and released over three years later in exchange for Palestinian prisoners (Melman, 2004). Another example is the case of Omer El-Heyb, a Lieutenant Colonel in the IDF from the Bedouin village of Beit-Zarzir, who was accused of spying for the Hezbollah in exchange for smuggling hundreds of kilos of drugs into Israel (Rofe-Ofir, 2004). In April 2006 El-Heyb was convicted of contacts with a foreign agent and dealing drugs (Greenberg, 2006). The police focus specifically on such activities as a long-term prevention strategy, while cooperating with intelligence and law enforcement agencies both in Israel and abroad.

2) Response Activities Once the Attack Has Been Launched: Obstacles and Delay Tactics.

An important function of the Israeli police is to intercept terrorists once an attack has been launched, and to make it more difficult to actually carry out the attack. This function has two distinct components. The first is to “slow down” or “capture” terrorists on the way to carry out a specific attack. The second is to educate the public and improve everyday security preparedness.

Because of the small size of the State of Israel, attacks launched in the Palestinian territories can reach Israeli cities in less than half an hour if they are not intercepted or slowed down. The Israeli police have developed a series of strategies to hinder terrorist movement once an attack is underway, including setting up road blocks, creating traffic jams, issuing public warnings, closing specific public facilities or streets, etc. The goals of these obstacles are twofold. The first objective is to slow

down the terrorists as much as possible, and by doing so increase the chances of interdiction before the attack takes place. Secondly, obstacles compel the terrorist to take counter actions, which may include involving other people or using communication devices. These actions increase opportunities for intelligence collection, both human and signal.

An example for this type of successful interdiction occurred on March 21, 2006. An alert from the "SHABAK" indicated that a suicide bomber carrying an explosives belt was on his way to carry out an attack. The police set up road blocks around Jerusalem and in other designated areas, checking suspicious cars and people, while significantly slowing down traffic. Around Sha'albim, east of Road Number 1 that connects Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, the police identified and stopped a suspicious van with ten Palestinian passengers, one of them later found to be carrying a heavy explosives belt. The bomb was neutralized and the other passengers were taken in for questioning (Diez, 2006).

When terrorists are interdicted the police try to disarm or capture them with minimal injury to innocent civilians or police. While capture of terrorists is the first goal, there are also procedures that specify when it is permissible to kill a terrorist suspect in order to prevent further injury to civilians or the police. The Israel National Police guidelines for the use of lethal force specify that such force may be used in cases where it is the only way to prevent injury to the responding officer, his or her colleagues or innocent civilians. These types of decisions involve important ethical and legal questions that are often dealt with by Israeli police commanders, and sometimes challenged by the courts.

A well known example is the case of Mahmud Sa'id Salah. In March 8, 2002, Salah, who was on his way to carry out a suicide attack in Jerusalem, was stopped by

local police officers. Salah was arrested, handcuffed and placed on his knees. It was then discovered that he was wearing an explosive belt which had the detonator in the front, on his stomach. Salah struggled with the police and did not allow the bomb-disposal officer to neutralize the bomb. Indeed, he kept trying to fall on his stomach so as to set it off. The officers at the scene feared that the bomb would go off, killing the officers who were holding him. The officers contacted the District Commander who then ordered the officers to shoot Salah in the head from close range and sequentially pull the body backwards, so as to prevent an explosion.

This decision was later investigated by the Ministry of Justice, Division for Officer Investigations ("Machash"), which decided that the shooting was justified since the officers were in immediate mortal danger and had no viable alternative for neutralizing the bomb (Ben-David, 2002; Cohen, 2005). Salah's brother appealed to the Magistrate Court in Jerusalem, which ruled that a cause-of-death investigation was not warranted since the cause of death was known and there was no indication of a criminal act. This decision was later upheld by the Supreme Court (Cohen, 2005).

Apart from the ethical and legal questions that arise in such situations, practical considerations also affect police decision making. Since the explosives used by Palestinian terrorists are often home-made, they are extremely volatile and can easily be set off. If an officer identifies a terrorist, makes the decision to shoot and hits the device, the device will most likely detonate. Even if the shooter accurately hits the suspect in the head, he or she may fall down and again, the device might explode. Even the use of a taser device may set off the bomb.

Recognition of this volatility, often leads police officers to exercise significant caution before trying to apprehend a terrorist suspect. For example, following the suicide attack at the entrance to the "Hasharon" mall in Netanya in December, 2005,

the police officer who identified the attacker indicated that she could not shoot since the terrorist was surrounded by many people (Azolai, 2005). Accordingly, if a suspect is identified, one of the immediate goals is to isolate and disarm the terrorist in an area where, if the device goes off, no one apart from the terrorist will be harmed.

The second component of this function- educating the public and improving routine security preparedness- is carried out through a wide array of training and information efforts. The police play a central role in educating the public from an early age to be aware of indications of possible terrorism events and to report their suspicions to the police. For example, police visit elementary schools to meet with children, issue warnings to be alert regarding suspicious objects or people in shopping areas, and request citizens to provide information if they observe suspicious activities. Additionally, once specific information about a terrorist in a certain area is available, the police immediately make announcements through the media, informing the public to stay away from crowded places and to be alert. A similar approach is taken in the United Kingdom, where police focus attention on developing public awareness of suspicious behavior (suspicious short-term tenants, suspicious people who have bought or rented a car, etc.); advancing suitable reporting mechanisms; and creating working relationships with the business community to discuss potential threats and provide guidance on appropriate security measures (Howard, 2004).

One example of public alertness and its importance in preventing terrorism may be found in an incident that took place in Jerusalem on September 4, 2001. A woman approached two Border Guard officers on Nevi'im Street and brought their attention to a man who was dressed as an ultra orthodox Jew. This man raised her suspicion since, despite his clothing, he wore pointy shoes, which are very uncharacteristic of ultra orthodox Jews. The officers approached the man, who was

indeed a suicide bomber who detonated himself a few minutes later wounding the two officers. However, because of the woman's alertness and the officers' response a much larger attack was avoided (Shyowitz, 2001).

The success of police education and information activities can be measured in part by the fact that the police bomb squad responds to over 200,000 calls a year from citizens. Despite the fact that most of these calls do not lead to the identification of explosives, the police treat each and every call as if it was an actual security threat, both because of the potential damage from a single terrorist attack, and to show that they are responsive to the public. Such responsiveness is considered an important method for encouraging the public to continue to cooperate with the police in preventing terrorism. It is also important in increasing public confidence in the police. In turn, at least in the field of counter-terrorism, the police are viewed by the public as responding quickly and efficiently to immediate threats (see Fishman, 2005).

General prevention and awareness is also aided by volunteers in the Israeli Civil Guard (ICG). As noted earlier, the Civil Guard was established to support policing efforts, and is under the direct supervision and control of the police (the ICG is located within the "Community Section" of the INP). ICG volunteers patrol local communities or business districts with arms provided by the police, and have police powers, responsibilities and obligations while on duty. The success of the civil guard in attracting voluntary participation in law enforcement and terror prevention has been noted in a number of studies (e.g. see Shapira, 2003; Yanay, 1994).

As noted earlier, Civil Guard volunteers support the police in a number of different areas.⁸ Nonetheless, assisting in counter-terrorism is one of the main goals

of the Civil Guard and the initial reason for its establishment. While volunteers may join one of several programs, the largest and most significant focuses on issues of homeland security. These volunteers are organized by local "operation centers", and focus on preventing terrorist and criminal activities in their home communities through activities such as patrolling and setting up roadblocks.

Volunteers in other Civil Guard programs assist counter-terrorism efforts in accordance with the role of the unit to which they are assigned. For example, they assist the bomb squad by closing down the scene of a suspicious object and by keeping bystanders from crowding after a terrorist attack; they assist the Border Guard by patrolling areas close to the Palestinian territories using jeeps; some assist the police in securing major events such as concerts or protest marches; some focus on securing public transportation by checking bus stops and buses for suspicious objects or people; and lastly, members of ZAKA ("Identifying Disaster Victims"), who also operate under the auspices of the Civil Guard, remove human remains from terror attack scenes according to Jewish Law and in ways meant to preserve the dignity of the victims.⁹

3) Response Activities Once the Attack has Occurred: Controlling the Damage

Beyond general prevention efforts, the police play a critical role in homeland security responses once a terrorist attack has occurred. In this context, the police work closely with private security firms and play a central role in supervising private security activities. In Israel, all malls, shopping areas, restaurants, hospitals, office buildings or any other public facilities, have private security guards who check customers entering the facility and conduct other security related activities. Before

licenses for operation are given to such facilities, the police must approve all security procedures. Additionally, once the facility is in operation, the police perform periodic security checks, and facilities that do not hold to the security standards set by the police may be forced to shut down with a court order. For example, in February 2005 the police in Jerusalem sent a suspicious ambulance to the four main hospitals in Jerusalem. The license plates were switched so the number in the front did not match the one in the back, and a 9 kilo dummy bomb was hidden inside. Out of the four, in only one hospital was the ambulance identified as suspicious and stopped by security. As a result of the test, new security procedures were implemented (Ben-David and Zinger, 2005).

To reduce possible damage and injury from terrorist attacks, the police work with the private security agencies to ensure that terrorists are unlikely to gain access to and enter public facilities. The underlying principle here is that an explosion that takes place within a closed environment will result in a much more severe negative outcome than if the same explosion took place outside the facility. A number of terrorist attacks in Israel have caused relatively less damage and fewer injuries because of this approach. For example, in the attack at the entrance to the "Hasharon" mall in Netanya mentioned earlier, a security guard who was standing at the entrance identified the attacker, and pushed him against the wall. At that moment the terrorist detonated the bomb, and the security guard, along with four other people, were killed, while 65 were injured. The result, however, would have been much worse had the terrorist been successful in gaining access to the mall (Meiri, Mozgovia, Levi and Shaked, 2005).

The police in Israel are the first responders to any terrorist attack, and are responsible for all activities that take place throughout the process, until the scene is

cleared. First, the area is divided into two circles, the inner-scene and outer-ring. The first responders to the inner-scene are the bomb-squad, along with the medics who, at this stage, treat and evacuate only the critically injured. The bomb-squad closes down the inner-scene and searches for secondary devices or additional terrorists, since in recent years it has been common for terrorists to use a series of devices timed so that medics or police who come to respond to the incident are injured by the second device. An example of such a sequence of explosions occurred in Jerusalem on December 1, 2001. Two suicide bombers detonated themselves about a block away, one minute apart. About 20 minutes later, while police, medics and fire fighters were working at the scene, a car bomb exploded in the same area. Six people died in this series of explosions, and over 150 were injured, 11 of them critically (Samuel et al., 2001).

At the same time that the inner-scene is closed by the bomb squad, other police units close down the outer ring, for the purpose of directing traffic and controlling crowds, and searching for accomplices who might have assisted the attacker and are trying to get away. Once the police have given their permission, medical teams re-enter the inner-scene, this time to treat and evacuate all injured. Simultaneously, members of "ZAKA" (see above) enter the scene, along with forensic units. The goal of the forensic units is to collect intelligence and try to identify the type of explosive device for the purpose of linking it to a specific terrorist organization or laboratory.

With regard to organization and hierarchy, the scene commander is the police territorial commander, which is either the District or the Sub-District Commander. He or she is the ultimate and only commander on site, and all organizations involved are subordinated to this commander's authority, including the medics, "ZAKA", and even

the employees of the local city council who later clean up the area. Within the police, each unit has a distinct role that mirrors its day-to-day responsibilities: The bomb squad and the forensic units work within the inner-scene, searching for, identifying and disarming terrorist devices; the traffic police and patrol officers set up road blocks and direct traffic and crowd within the outer circle; the criminal investigators identify the victims and collect evidence; the intelligence units collect information that may assist in identifying the source of the explosives and the people responsible, while additional teams gather evidence and assist the victims.

All of these activities are expected to be accomplished in no more than four hours. As discussed earlier, the police view timing as critical for both psychological and forensic reasons. In addition to the need to collect evidence before the scene is contaminated, following the general goals of the Israeli model for policing terrorism, the police want to enable the public to continue with their daily routine as quickly as possible. It is expected that this rapid clean up of the site will minimize the ongoing effect of the attack and the related psychological distress of the public.

Another strategy by which the Israeli police attempt to reduce distress and fear after a terrorist attack is through the communication of information to the public during and after the attack, for which standard practices have been developed. From the beginning of the event and throughout the process, the territorial commander and his or her deputy or spokesperson, communicate ongoing information to the press and the public. This information includes details such as the description of the event, areas or roads that have been shut down and alternative routes. The underlying assumption here is that when there is not clear and accurate communication with the public, rumors and panic will fill the void.

What We Need to Know About Policing Terrorism

Our description of the Israeli model for policing terrorism suggests the complexity and diversity of the tasks that the INP has taken on in its homeland security efforts. It is also clear that this model demands a very high investment of police resources both human and financial. Our long term research interest is not only in describing in fuller detail the components of the Israeli model, but also in raising and answering key questions regarding the costs and benefits of the approach that has been developed. Such questions, of course, are relevant not only to the Israel National Police but to other Western democracies that are shifting greater homeland security responsibilities to the police. Key questions remain in terms of whether the model is successful in achieving its goals of reducing terrorism and damage from attacks, and what potential unintended or negative consequences derive from the intensive demands that this model places on the police.

As we noted in our introduction, the Israel National Police is considered highly efficient and professional in its approach to homeland security responsibilities (e.g. see Kamhine, 2000). But there is in fact little systematic research evidence that the Israeli model is achieving its goals. For example, though it is generally assumed that the activities of police are an important factor in understanding the resilience of Israelis after terrorist attacks, such assumptions are based on the general situation in Israel and not on specific research examining the connections between police activities and public attitudes. In turn, the strategic activities of the police have not been systematically assessed in terms of the comparative effectiveness of specific strategies. It is important to note that this lack of an evidence base for policing terrorism is not unique to Israel. In a recent Campbell Collaboration¹⁰ systematic

review of strategies to combat terrorism, Lum, Kennedy and Sherley (2006) could only identify seven studies that met minimal methodological requirements.¹¹ None of these seven studies examined a police intervention. Clearly, it is time for scholars to begin to evaluate the effectiveness of police responses to terrorism.

In assessing effectiveness however, our review suggests that we must go beyond traditional measures of outcomes, and take into account the multi-faceted nature of potential police responsibilities in homeland security. Accordingly, our measure of success cannot simply be whether terrorist events decline or are prevented, but also whether the consequences of successful events have been minimized. A case where a terrorist comes to his or her target, but is prevented from entering a public space, must be viewed as a successful response at least to some degree. The examples we gave earlier of the prevention of entry of terrorists to closed shopping malls, where damage would have been much greater, illustrate this point. Slowing down the pace of a terrorist on his or her way to carryout an attack may also provide important time for police to apprehend the terrorist or prepare for an attack, even if it cannot be fully prevented.

The police have a critical function as first responders to terrorist incidents. This is a task that the police have traditionally taken on in the case of emergencies, such as natural disasters or train accidents, and it is a natural role for the police. But in the case of terrorism, the police role may go much beyond securing the site of an event and preventing chaos in its immediate aftermath. As we have discussed, the Israeli police see their role as much broader than this, and as extending much beyond the terrorist incident itself. Indeed, at the core of the Israel National Police model for preventing terrorism, is the goal of strengthening public resolve in the face of

terrorism and allowing citizens to maintain normal patterns of work and leisure. This means as well that in assessing the success of policing terrorism we must measure public attitudes, and assess changes in the everyday patterns of work and leisure in affected communities.

In measuring the effectiveness of police responses to terrorism, we must also take into account collateral consequences of focusing police resources on homeland security functions. Specific unintended impacts on traditional policing operations must be addressed in developing a fair appraisal of the Israeli model of policing terrorism, as well as in developing models in the United States and other Western democracies (see Bayley and Weisburd, Forth.).

There are likely to be significant opportunity costs in police investment of major resources in homeland security functions. Assuming an unlimited supply of resources for the police, it might be possible to predict little impact of policing terrorism on other police functions. But such major increases in policing budgets are unlikely. Rather, police agencies often operate within limited budgets, in which they must balance different services to the public. This has certainly been the experience of the Israeli police, which, for example, did not receive any major increase in its budget during the period of heightened security concerns during the Second Palestinian Intifada, despite the fact that the threat of terrorism increased geometrically (see Atad, 2001; Nahoom-Halevi, 2005, also see the budget of the Ministry of Public Security, Israel, for the year 2007¹²). It is reasonable to assume that in Israel and in other countries, more resources for counter terrorism and homeland security will likely lead to fewer resources for traditional crime control functions.

This tension between the role of the Israeli police in fighting terrorism and traditional crime control emerged as a central issue in a recent forum on the police and society, organized by the Israel Democracy Institute in July 2004 (Fishman, 2005). Participants at the forum, which included ranking police commanders, social-scientists, legal scholars, and representatives from the community, suggested that the investment of police resources in countering terrorism is one of the main reasons why the Israel National Police was somewhat late in identifying the phenomenon of organized crime networks in Israel, and in assessing their impact on law and public order. It was argued moreover, that the diversion of resources to homeland security functions hampered the development of advanced data systems, technologies, and efforts to enhance the professionalism and skills of Israeli police officers. It was also suggested that limited resources, combined with the numerous tasks of normal and homeland security policing, resulted in officer fatigue. In the view of forum participants, this also led to degradation in the quality of service provided to the public, and ultimately more crime (Fishman, 2005). Importantly, the necessity of dividing existing resources between crime control and counter-terrorism, as well as concerns about its implications, are beginning to be raised in American law enforcement agencies as well (see Riley, Treverton, Wilson, and Davis, 2005).

The prioritization of homeland security activities, moreover, also affects the ability of police agencies to provide “normal” police services. For example, after a terrorist attack (or even in the process of preventing an attack), many officers from different units, including administrative staff, are called to stop their routine activities, and attend the scene. Everything that is not considered urgent is pushed aside. Many of the issues that trouble local communities may not be viewed as "urgent" in this context, and attention to these problems is delayed or terminated altogether. A similar

process was observed in Montgomery County in 2002 when police were trying to identify and capture a sniper responsible for a series of fatal shootings (University of Maryland Symposium, 2003¹³). A number of units, including the sexual crimes unit, were closed for a period because officers were shifted to the more pressing sniper investigation.

A reduction in focus on crime control may be a consequence not only of resource allocation, but also of the perception of the public that crime control is a low priority of the police. Participants in the Israeli Democracy Institute forum argued that many citizens felt that there was no point in reporting crimes such as theft or robbery to the police, since they viewed the police as unable to suitably respond to these types of events given their preoccupation with homeland security concerns. Such perceptions, combined with the reality of the limitations of police service to the public, are assumed to lead to great frustration and feelings of vulnerability, which, in turn, are seen to result in decreased public trust and negative perceptions of the police (Fishman, 2005). These issues seem particularly pronounced with regard to the Israeli-Arab population (See Hasisi, 2006; Rattner and Hasisi, 2005).

Bayley and Weisburd (Forth.) also point to the potential danger of the attractiveness of “high policing” in contrast to traditional crime control or “low policing” obligations. Anti-terrorism and homeland security activities appear to have particular salience and status for police. When community policing was promoted in the 1980s and 1990s, police resisted taking on its community-engaged and servicing functions, preferring to rely on higher status preventive patrolling and criminal investigation (Braga and Weisburd, 2006; Weisburd and McElroy, 1988; Weisburd, et al., 2002). Similarly, Bayley and Weisburd (Forth) argue that there will be a tendency

for the police to prefer homeland security related “high policing” over traditional low policing functions. This same tension was noted by Jerome Skolnick (1993) in regard to the natural tendency of police to pursue drug related arrests. Evaluating the effectiveness of policing terrorism, accordingly, must include measurement of the potential degradation of traditional crime prevention functions when counter terrorism and homeland security become important tasks in policing.

It is also important to assess the effects of anti-terrorism responsibilities on police respect for human rights and adherence to democratic standards of policing. As Bayley and Weisburd (Forth.) argue:

As previous campaigns of counter-espionage have shown, high policing is difficult to control. Because protection from terrorism is so obviously a righteous cause, high policing can lead to the infringement of human rights, particularly the procedural protections of due process, and to the overzealous and sometimes illegal monitoring of speech, thought, and association. Big Brother replaces 'serve and protect'.

The INP, in this regard, have been the subject of repeated investigation and criticism (B’Tselem, 1990, 2001) and American police agencies have also been challenged because of intelligence abuses (Richman, 2004-2005).

Just as homeland security functions may impact upon the abilities of police to pay adequate attention to crime control, it may have substantive consequences for their development of contacts with the public. Expressing this concern in regard to the American situation after 9/11, Braga and Weisburd (2006:350) argue:

...this new set of demands, with its emphasis on collecting intelligence on terrorist networks, apprehending terror operatives, and protecting likely targets, may push policing back to a more professional model

that is distant from the community. Indeed, there is a real potential for a backward shift as federal financial support and attention has been directed toward enhancing local law enforcement's role in maintaining homeland security while, at the same time, funding for community crime prevention efforts has been drastically reduced.

In recent years, the importance of developing close relations with the community has become a key component of policing both in Israel (Weisburd et al. 2002) and in other Western democracies (Baley, 1994; Greene, 2000; National Research Council, 2004; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). This is often noted in the context of community policing programs, which have also been found to reduce fear of crime (National Research Council, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004), and enhance police legitimacy (Skogan, 2006). Importantly, such perceived legitimacy of police actions has been linked closely to citizen support, cooperation, and obedience to the law (Tyler, 1990, 2004).

We might assume that such questions will be most salient in minority communities that are linked ethnically or nationally to terrorist groups. This problem is particularly important to examine in the Israeli context, because of the familial and national ties of Israeli Arabs to Palestinians in surrounding countries and the Palestinian controlled territories. The Israel National Police in recent years has tried to develop community policing models that would encourage police-community relationships in Arab villages and towns within Israel (Weisburd et al., 2002). However, we suspect that the counter-terrorism functions of the Israeli police are likely to clash with the goals of creating closer police-community relations in these areas. It is difficult to be “officer friendly” one day, and to enter a village or town the next to gain intelligence on suspects that may be from the area, or have family or other contacts there. A similar concern was voiced by police in regard to assisting

immigration authorities in the US. Some police managers in areas near the Mexican border, responded negatively to requests for help in identifying illegal immigrants because they thought it would damage the strong relations that they had developed with Mexican American communities in those areas (McDonald, 2003)

Bayley and Weisburd (Forth) argue that “high policing changes the mind-set of officers from service to suspicion, where people are viewed as suspects to be watched rather than individuals to be helped.” Of course, this perspective is very different from the community policing ideas that have strengthened community-police relationships over the last few decades (See review by National Research Council, 2004; Skogan, 2006). One consequence of policing terrorism that must be assessed is whether it naturally leads to a reduction in police-community collaboration and partnerships:

George Kelling and Mark Moore (1989) have argued that American police, and to some extent the police in other developed democracies, evolved during the 20th century through three distinct periods of reform - professionalism, constitutionalism, and community-involvement. By implication, if covert counterterrorism by local police is not handled very carefully, it could push the clock back, undoing decades of community consultation and involvement, collaborative problem-solving, and adherence to the rule of law.

The general point is that legitimacy is the bedrock of successful policing, whether in the control of ordinary crime or of terrorism. It can be lost by acts of omission as well as commission on the part of police. Using frontline police as "high police" can, ironically, jeopardize the very advantages that local policing have in the war on terror. (Bayley and Weisburd, Forth)

While scholars have focused attention on the possible negative consequences of policing terrorism on police-community relationships, they have often ignored potential benefits that may accrue to the police as a result of adopting counter terrorism and homeland security functions. For example, it has been claimed that perceived police successes in handling terror threats and attacks in Israel during the past few years, along with its noticeable presence within and outside city centers, has put the Israeli police at the center of public attention, thereby improving its reputation and enhancing public sympathy. Some police and scholars argue that the Israeli police have earned the positive public perception that is usually reserved for the Israeli Army and the "SHABAK" (Fishman, 2005).

Clearly, one reason for this is that the Israeli police work closely with communities in their homeland security efforts. They attend schools and educate children about terrorism and its prevention; they encourage the public to report suspicious objects or people, and are perceived to respond very efficiently to such calls; they encourage the public to join the Civil Guard and assist in counter-terrorism efforts; they make sure public facilities are well secure; and they are generally seen to handle scenes of terror attacks efficiently.

Innes (2006) moreover notes in a discussion of policing terrorism in the United Kingdom, that police can also play a central role in minimizing ethnic conflicts that result from heightened concerns with terrorism. While we did not hear of similar efforts in Israel, we think that Innes's discussion once again points to the need for greater examination of police functions that might enhance community solidarity in the face of terrorist threats. As part of the British Police responses to a terrorist attack, officers carry out activities such as high-visibility "reassurance" patrols at designated areas, as well as mass media campaigns. Additionally, the police

in the UK see themselves as responsible for managing the local impact of geopolitical events. For example, when military actions were being taken in Afghanistan, the police were concerned that this would trigger tensions between ethnic groups in local communities (Innes, 2006).

Summary and Conclusions

The Israeli model for policing terrorism seeks to minimize the impacts of terrorism on the everyday routines of Israeli citizens. Its goal simply stated is to allow the population to act as if terrorism did not exist, even during periods in which terrorist threats are high. Even when the everyday routines of Israeli citizens are impeded, for example when roadblocks slow traffic, or terrorist attacks have succeeded, the policing strategies employed are developed in ways that are expected to reduce fear and the long term impacts of terrorist events. Our review of the Israeli model for policing terrorism points to the complex and multifaceted role that police can play in counter terrorism and homeland security. The police are involved in early prevention, interdiction, and treatment of the sources of terrorism; response activities once the attack has been launched; and response activities once the attack has occurred. In our paper we have presented an initial description of these roles as they are understood by the police, and thus have provided the first systematic presentation of the Israeli model of policing terrorism that we are aware of. While there are, as noted above, limitations to our ability to draw inferences from the Israeli case to the US and other Western democracies, the Israeli model is an important example to draw lessons from both because it has been developed in the context of a democratic policing agency, and because it is the result of decades of experience.

Our review has also led us to raise a series of questions, that we view as critical for developing a broader understanding not only of the Israeli model for policing terrorism, but also more generally for our understanding of the potential benefits, as well as dangers, of police taking a more significant role in counter terrorism and homeland security functions. To date, there is no solid scientific evidence of which policing strategies are effective in countering and controlling terrorism, just as there is little evidence regarding counter terrorism strategies more generally (Lum et al., 2004). We have moreover argued that in measuring effectiveness, scholars and policy makers must take into account a series of different possible outcomes of policing terrorism. Scholars must not only take into account whether terrorist attacks are prevented, they must also recognize that many police strategies are geared toward reducing the consequences of terrorist attacks that have been launched and cannot be fully prevented. We must also recognize that policing terrorism may have consequences for other functions of the police, such as crime control or service to the public. While policing terrorism in this context may increase public confidence in the police in the short run as it responds to vital security concerns, it may lead to long term tensions as the police become alienated from the public and fail to deal with local crime problems.

These concerns emphasize the importance of adding empirical data to our discussion of policing terrorism and its consequences. In this sense, our work here is a preliminary step in developing knowledge about the role of the police in counter terrorism and homeland security. Today, police agencies around the world are rushing to improve their counter terrorism and homeland security capabilities. Studies like ours are critical, so that we can define the strategies the police should use and the

potential negative consequences that a focus on policing terrorism may have for the police and the community.

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Footnotes

¹ While we recognize that Homeland Security may also refer to securing a nation during time of war, we follow its recent usage as referring to national efforts to respond to terrorist threats (see web site for homeland security agency in US: www.dhs.gov).

² See the website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA>

³ See www.police.gov.il

⁴ See www.police.gov.il

⁵ See www.police.gov.il

⁶ See www.police.gov.il

⁷ See speech by Prime Minister Olmert on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/Address%20by%20PM%20Olmert%20at%20opening%20of%20Knesset%20Winter%20Session%2016-Oct-2006>

⁸ See www.police.gov.il

⁹ See www.zaka.org.il

¹⁰ See www.campbellcollaboration.org

¹¹ The study had to compare two or more units of analysis with and without counterterrorism intervention; to attempt to provide control within a statistical analysis; or to analyze temporal ordering of effects; and not to be a medical study (Lum et al., 2006).

¹² In Hebrew, available online from: <http://www.mof.gov.il/budget2007/docs/302.pdf>

¹³ This symposium of police executives from the Washington, D.C. tri-state area took place at the University of Maryland, College Park on May 9, 2003, and was organized by the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Police Research Group.